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The Politics of Global Governance in UN
Peacekeeping
PHILIP CUNLIFFE
This article examines the allocation of roles and responsibilities in the construction of UN
peacekeeping. The case is made that decision making in UN peacekeeping is not only frag-
mented between various states and institutional actors, but also critically lopsided, with an
uneven distribution of responsibilities and the majority of political, military and strategic
risks falling upon those countries least able to bear them – poor and weak states. States
that hold decision-making power are not the states that have to implement those decisions.
The article concludes by arguing that this governance structure is not a symptom of organ-
izational dysfunction, but that it serves a political function by allowing influence to be
wielded without risk.
This article identifies some of the political problems arising from the disjointed
governance structure of UN peacekeeping. The aim is to explore and to help con-
ceptualize the governance of global conflict management as manifested in UN
peacekeeping, and in particular the uneven distribution between the positions
of power, and the distribution of roles and responsibilities in the construction
of UN peacekeeping. As Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore have observed,
most scholarship on international organization proceeds by way of analytical
constructs intended to retrospectively capture why particular organizations and
institutions are established. This focus comes at the expense of capturing how
such institutions function.1 In line with their approach, this article focuses on
the political functioning of UN peacekeeping.
The collective decision making whereby the collective UN decision to deploy
peacekeepers can be made independently of the national commitment of person-
nel, introduces a peculiar dynamic into peacekeeping: a perverse set of incentives
and skewed balance of risk and reward, where no single actor bears the brunt of
political and strategic responsibility for any single field operation. This state of
affairs has important political benefits for peacekeeping actors – what David
Chandler has called the attraction of ‘rhetoric without responsibility’.2 Moral
authority can be claimed without having to be burdened with the responsibility
for decisions that have to be implemented by others. Taking a cue from Mats
Berdal’s analysis of the surge in UN peacekeeping since the turn of the century,
I argue that the way to analytically resolve these contradictions in UN peacekeep-
ing is to be cognizant of the UN’s ‘unacknowledged functions’: those activities
that the UN successfully performs when it appears to be achieving very little.3
As such, the focus of the article shifts the object of inquiry from the conduct, per-
formance and outcome of UN field operations (the object of most peacekeeping
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scholarship), to help conceptualize the ways in which peacekeeping operations
are put together.
The argument proceeds as follows: after reviewing the process of ‘force
generation’ before a peacekeeping operation is deployed, I discuss the Security
Council and its role in peacekeeping. It is argued that Council control of peace-
keeping is not a given, but the result of a protracted diplomatic struggle and a
direct consequence of the harmony that has prevailed on the Council since the
end of the cold war. I then briefly examine how the struggle for the control of
peacekeeping is reflected in the make-up and institutional organization of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). In the following section, I
turn to examine that other crucial aspect of peacekeeping contribution: finance.
In the penultimate section of the article, I suggest that the institutionally fragmen-
ted nature of UN decision making and burden sharing means that uneven policy
development is possible. This means that political risks are unevenly distributed
throughout the UN structure and skewed in favour of wealthier and more power-
ful states. This is not simply a case of flawed organization, weak administrative
reforms or a poorly designed institution: it is an organizational trait that is repro-
duced by the political interests it serves. This is one of the ‘unacknowledged func-
tions’ of the UN. I place the establishment of the new UN Peacebuilding
Commission in this context of attempts to rectify those institutional deadlocks.
By way of conclusion, I argue that the problem hinges around the fact that
those who control the direction of UN peacekeeping (principally the dominant
powers of the Security Council) are able to displace the military, political and
strategic risks and personnel costs of labour-intensive peacekeeping onto the
poorer and weaker states of the global South. This is a system of governance,
in so far as it ‘encompasses the activities of governments [and] the many other
channels through which “commands” flow in the form of goals framed, directives
issued and policies pursued’.4 But in the case of peacekeeping, it is a system of
governance whose lack of efficiency and effectiveness is a result of its exclusion
and inequity, which in turn reflect the underlying inequality of the international
order.
Force Generation in Peacekeeping
Stephen Kinloch-Pichat observes that the picture for the deployment of UN mili-
tary personnel is almost the inverse of that for nation-states:
While the main problem for a nation-state resides in using non-integrated
‘non-national’ (foreign) elements to fights its wars, the main risk for an
international organization is to rely exclusively on ‘national’ – that is,
not truly integrated and international – contingents to carry out its
operations.5
The Brahimi Report identified an ideal pathway for the formation of peacekeeping
operations ‘involving three sequential stages’: first, forging a political basis for peace
in the country or region of deployment. Second, a suitable mandate is crafted in the


























to the scale of the task as specified in the mandate.6 Simon Chesterman says that the
‘accepted reality is that this [process of force generation] usually happens in reverse
order’: ‘member states determine what resources they are prepared to commit to a
problem and a mandate is cobbled together around these resources – often in the
hope that a political solution will be forthcoming’.7 Berdal is less pessimistic,
arguing that the Brahimi Report has had a ‘noticeable’ impact on field missions
and the workings of the DPKO, which has succeeded in implementing as many as
two-thirds of the Panel’s recommendation. Evidence of these changes can be seen
in the dramatic ‘surge’ in peacekeeping since the turn of the century.8
Contribution of personnel is not evenly distributed from around the world,
however, with the majority of peacekeepers coming from poor and developing
countries, principally from South Asia, Western and Eastern Africa (although
of course the global South includes some countries that aspire to major power
status, such as China, India and Brazil).9 It is important to stress that at each
of these moments of the force generation process, Southern countries do not
merely key into passive bureaucratic structures. When Southern states contribute
peacekeeping forces, their involvement keys into a politically active, dynamic
organization that is in flux and subject to numerous pressures from both within
and without.10 In terms of peacekeeping, the influence of the major powers is
most apparent in the delegation of authority from the Security Council, and in
the financing of peacekeeping operations.
The Global Governance of UN Peacekeeping
Viewing the UN as an institutional site of struggle rather than a static bureau-
cratic structure clarifies the institutional evolution of peacekeeping in the UN.
The authority to deploy UN forces has been battled over both openly and cov-
ertly, explicitly and informally, since the founding of the organization. In this
time, political authority over peacekeeping has passed from the Security
Council to the General Assembly and back again. Since the end of the UN Security
Force in West New Guinea in 1963 that transferred West Iran to Indonesian
sovereignty from Dutch colonial rule, authority over peacekeeping has been
firmly in the grip of the Security Council. The so-called ‘classical peacekeeping’
of the cold war emerged in the context of Soviet–American rivalries on the
Council: it was the General Assembly that authorized the 1956 UN Emergency
Force (UNEF), under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure first used by the United
States to outflank the Soviet veto in the Security Council during the 1950–53
Korean War.11 Today by contrast, peacekeeping has boomed in the context of
unprecedented harmony and cooperation. The changing political character of
relations on the Council has changed the nature of Council involvement with
the providers of peacekeeping personnel.
As the strictures of the cold war set limits on the interventions that great
powers could carry out outside their spheres of influence, the UN mobilized
smaller powers to resolve this impasse. This was a policy consciously promoted
by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjo¨ld, who flagged up the rhetoric of
national independence as a way of mobilizing the newly decolonized and

























smaller powers as a political constituency for his own expanding role. Building
the UN as a haven for smaller powers amidst the gales of cold war rivalry gave
himself and the Secretariat greater room for manoeuvre in respect of Moscow
and Washington.12 Due in no small part to Hammarskjo¨ld’s efforts, UN influence
was thus not seen as contradicting national independence in the Third World.
Indeed, Hammarskjo¨ld flagged up the multinational composition of the 1960–
64 mission in the Congo to parry Soviet charges of UN imperialism.13
The point here is that when it emerged, peacekeeping represented the
enfranchisement of the small powers in the context of a UN system paralysed
by cold war. In the context of the early cold war peacekeeping operations, the
mobilization of the small powers was contingent on the restraint of the super-
powers enforced by their mutual confrontation. Today, the opposite relationship
holds, as the political character of the Security Council is very different: harmony
prevails on the Council, and yet peacekeeping has boomed.
As Malone points out, ‘the ability and disposition of the five permanent
members . . . to cooperate with each other seriously diminished the margin for
manoeuvre of other Council members’.14 This was enhanced due to US control
of the Security Council agenda, which can be traced back to the signing of the
Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia in 1995.15 This has ‘enhanced the
standing of the Security Council’.16 As regards peacekeeping contributions,
the Council has indeed expanded consultation with contributing countries.17
The expanded possibilities for consultation with the Council represent one
means for troop contributing countries to secure access to major powers and
obtain influence within the Council. This is one important potential boon of
being a peacekeeping contributor. However, if this is a special privilege conferred
on contributors, it also reflects the enhanced authority of the conferring body. In
other words, the Council’s expanded consultation procedures since the end of the
cold war reflect the extension of Council authority, which now draws on a broad
variety of ‘constituents’: the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) committee,
the Secretariat, NGOs, and the wider UN membership.18 In other words, this
signals not the uplifting of poor contributing states as much as their being
locked into a new means by which the Council has consolidated its control over
UN procedure and institutional politics.19
One means by which smaller powers may be given some control over the
direction of the Council agenda is through the election of non-permanent
members to the Council. The powers of such a position are already limited, as
‘effective decision-making . . . is monopolized by the Permanent Five’. Rather,
non-permanent membership offers ‘the ability to raise points of interest in discus-
sions; to learn about the views of others and about the leanings of the Council on
given issues; and to appear to be at the center of important things’.20 Require-
ments on equitable geographic representation limit the extent to which the
major peacekeeping powers can shape the Council agenda. For Council elections,
Asia and Africa count as one geographic region, thereby limiting the number of
Southern peacekeepers that can be elected to the Council (as most peacekeeping
powers hail from these two continents). The list of countries elected to the


























peacekeeping contribution: from 1996 to 2009 only Kenya, Ghana, Bangladesh
and South Africa are represented as large peacekeeping powers.21
This revitalization of the Security Council at the end of the cold war changed
the pattern of political calculation on the part of states within the UN system, as
noted by Thomas Weiss: ‘Excluded countries wanted a part of the action, to
defend their own viewpoints from the risk of being ignored by a new sort of P-
5 [Permanent Five members’] condominium’.22 According to Malone there is
ample evidence of this in the Council’s working, with growing high-handedness
on the part of the P5 and changes in working procedure that has consolidated
the dominance of the P5 and in particular the United States.23 Another barometer
of this consolidation of Council authority is the declining use of the veto, the
1991–2000 period seeing only seven vetoes cast, the lowest for any decade of
the UN’s history.24 Fewer vetoes cast mean fewer fissures in great power diplo-
macy for other powers to exploit.
Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson make clear that the predominance of
the Security Council has beaten back the role of the General Assembly in the field
of international peace and security.25 If peacekeeping may enfranchise small
states, according to Wallensteen and Johansson the benefit has been off-set by
the collaboration of the Security Council in the post-cold war era.26 The
changed context of power relations forces states to behave in different ways.
Of course, no period of great power ‘concert’ lasts indefinitely and as the inter-
national environment evolves the benefits of collaboration and consensus are
eventually eroded by the centrifugal forces of self-interest. Yet despite this, the
diplomatic controversy before the 2003 American invasion of Iraq has failed to
dent the Council’s penchant for peacekeeping. As Mats Berdal noted of the
2003 diplomatic crisis in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq:
Notwithstanding the deep divisions among member states that emerged
over Iraq in 2003, and which many predicted would have a lasting and
paralysing effect on the Security Council, new [peacekeeping] missions
have been authorised and existing ones substantially expanded . . . at an
unprecedented rate.27
This included Euro-American cooperation over interventions in both Haiti and
Eastern Congo.28 It is clear then, that against expectations, the greatest and
most divisive crisis on the Council since the end of the cold war did not impede
the conduct of peacekeeping; indeed, peacekeeping continued to grow. What is
striking here is the political effort involved in ensuring that peacekeeping contin-
ued unabated.29 The extent of cooperation on the Council in this instance is
important because it draws attention to the fact that political effort is required
to manage the unanimity of the Council. This is also stressed by Wallensteen
and Johansson: ‘the Council is not an independent body that by itself selects
which concerns it will attend to. It acts under the joint authorisation of the capi-
tals of member states’.30
The other component of Security Council change is the greater willingness to
use its coercive power, safe in the knowledge that it will not be vetoed. Great
power harmony correlates directly with the wielding of greater coercive power.

























The Council has flexed its muscles much more, invoking the sweeping range of
powers granted the Council under the terms of the UN Charter. According to
Wallensteen and Johansson, across the 1946–2002 period, 93 per cent of all
Chapter VII resolutions have been adopted since the end of the cold war.31
This panoply of sanctions, embargoes, international criminal prosecution and
use of force includes the coupling of the realm of international peace and security
with economic, social dimensions and ideas of sustainable development.32
There are several elements that are important here. While formally all peace-
keeping operates at the behest of the Security Council, there is a more distinctive
pattern at work since the end of the cold war: the growth of Southern contri-
bution to peacekeeping has taken place alongside unprecedented Security
Council cooperation and extension of Council power. The extended power of
the Security Council, including the tighter control that it exercises over the
scope of UN activity, indicates that the growth of the Southern peacekeeping
has been at the behest of the major powers on the Council. Southern peacekeeping
is not a product of divisions on the Council or its paralysis, but has coincided with
the most active, harmonious period in its history.
According to Jocelyn Coulon, in the early 1990s UN peacekeeping became
‘the focus of a bitter struggle for control between the UN and certain countries’.33
In particular, Coulon describes the wrangling between French and ‘Anglo-Saxon’
forces in one of the first large post-cold war operations, the 1992–93 UN Transi-
tional Authority in Cambodia operation.34 Interestingly, Coulon notes how the
French diplomatic offensive to wrest institutional control of UN peacekeeping
was justified by reference to the weight of French contribution to UN forces in
the early 1990s: ‘If France captured this key position at UN headquarters, it
would be in a position to wield considerable power in the political management
of an army of Blue Helmets that numbered close to 80,000 soldiers in September
1994’.35
Yet if France’s heavy peacekeeping contributions in the early 1990s justified
France securing the top position in the DPKO, it does not seem that heavy
Southern contribution to peacekeeping today has introduced any significant
shift to appointing Southern personnel in the Department. Indeed, quite the oppo-
site: in 2005, just under two-thirds of the long-term personnel in the Department
came from Northern states; in 2006, 38.5 per cent of the Department was com-
posed of Northern personnel and in 2007 the figure stood at 44.3 per cent.36
Kabilan Krishnasamy has argued that South Asian contributors fail to get their
due recognition in the UN system, as the composition of the Secretariat is deter-
mined primarily by monetary contributions to the UN.37 Rhetorical recognition
of Southern peacekeeping is not matched by any forward advance of Southern
peacekeepers becoming more deeply enmeshed within the functioning of the
UN system:38 ‘The pattern of appointing candidates mainly from Europe has
led to claims from Third World countries that the UN’s DPK [sic] is dominated
by NATO military planners at the higher levels of military planning and
execution’.39 This was addressed by the creation of the post of Deputy Military
Adviser in 1994, yet it remains an open issue, particularly given the fact there


























Jockeying for control of key posts continues with the wave of institutional
reform initiated in the wake of Ban Ki-Moon’s appointment as the new UN
Secretary-General, and his re-organization of the Secretariat. The retirement
of Jean-Marie Gue´henno from the post of Under-Secretary General of the
DPKO means that control over these peacekeeping forces moved up the
agenda, with the United States expressing interest in the post in early 2007
when Ban initiated changes to the department’s structure. In the end, while
France retains leadership of DPKO, the United States received in exchange a
head post of the Department of Political Affairs.41 The continued wrangling is
testimony to the perceived importance of the post, and the influence which
can be wielded through it.42
Personnel are one component of a peacekeeping operation; the other is the
financing – to pay for the troops, materiel and logistics. Interestingly, the
pattern that financing shows is almost the inverse, mirror image, of personnel
contribution: the rich countries dominate. I shall not reconstruct the Byzantine
system of UN financing here – suffice to say that the assessment methods are
based on individual member states’ capacity to pay, so that the poorest states
pay the least, while the P5 bear a surcharge given their constitutional responsibil-
ities for international peace and security.43 The largest financiers of UN peace-
keeping are countries that are among the smallest contributors in terms of
personnel, as Table 1 shows for the 1997–2007 period.44 The percentage
figures show the personnel contributions of these states as a proportion of total
UN peacekeeping deployments for that year.
Ross Fetterly points out that the differential assessment rates effectively mean
not only that a small group of rich countries support UN peacekeeping, but that
this group of countries have an incentive ‘in limiting the approval, size and
duration of peacekeeping missions funded by UN peacekeeping assessments’.45
Just as peacekeeping is dependent on the Security Council so too it is dependent
on the willingness of wealthy states to finance this activity. The effectively insti-
tutionalized system of arrears in UN finances reminds us that payment to the UN
is a political process rather than an automatic one – one that involves decision
making: payments can be used to influence debates, operations, opinion.46
The Unacknowledged Functions of UN Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping contribution is dependent on the willingness of the wealthy and the
powerful states to support it politically and financially. UN peacekeeping is
provided by a system of global governance rather than global government. It is
this that lays the ground for what is commonly understood as the dysfunction
or systematic weakness of the UN: collective policies can be established and man-
dates crafted with no regard to the question of whether the resources exist to fulfil
them. This indeed was the bane of UN actions in the early post-cold war period,
when UN peacekeeping efforts were expanding, while the commitment to that
expansion began to shrivel. This process was dramatically exposed in the
former Yugoslavia, as lamented by former UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali in relation to peacekeeping in Bosnia: ‘The Council, I said, is


























PEACEKEEPER CONTRIBUTIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL UN DEPLOYMENTS BY THE TOP 10 FINANCIERS OF UN PEACEKEEPING,
1997 – 2007
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 US 0.2 US 3 US 0.3 US 0.1 US 0.1
2 Japan 0.2 Japan 0.3 Japan 0.5 Japan 0.09 Japan 0.08
3 Germany 1 Germany 0.2 Germany 0.2 Germany 0.07 Germany 0.07
4 France 2 France 4.2 France 3.4 France 1 France 0.6
5 UK 2 Italy 0.6 Italy 0.4 Italy 0.2 UK 1.2
6 Italy 0.3 UK 2.8 UK 3.8 UK 1.1 Italy 0.6
7 Russia 4.9 Russia 2.1 Canada 2.7 Canada 0.7 Canada 0.6
8 Canada 4.5 Canada 2 Spain 0 Spain 0 Spain 0.01
9 Spain 0.3 Spain 0 Neth. 1.3 Neth. 0.3 Brazil 0.2
10 Brazil 2.1 Neth. 1 Russia 1.3 Australia 5.4 Neth. 0.05
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 US 0.08 US 0.03 US 0.03 US 0.03 US 0.03
2 Japan 1.9 Japan 1.6 Japan 0.77 Japan 0.04 Japan 0.04
3 Germany 0.06 Germany 0.15 Germany 0.05 Germany 0.06 Germany 0.06
4 France 0.7 UK 1.5 UK 0.8 UK 0.5 UK 0.46
5 UK 1.2 France 0.7 France 0.8 France 0.79 France 0.74
6 Italy 0.77 Italy 0.3 Italy 0.22 Italy 0.46 Italy 0.11
7 Canada 0.5 Canada 0.7 Canada 0.4 Canada 0.36 Canada 0.65
8 Spain 0.01 Spain 0.02 Spain 0.01 Spain 0.34 Spain 0.31
9 Brazil 0.23 China 0.75 China 1.6 China 1.4 China 1.33







































































becoming like the General Assembly: it is using phrases and making demands that
it knows cannot be implemented in order to please public opinion’.47
The precondition for such behaviour is the institutional fragmentation of the
UN, whereby no single actor bears the full costs of any UN decision on peace-
keeping. It is for this reason that policy can be enacted with no regard or
concern for the consequences on the ground, or even any understanding of the
context on the ground. Another example of where such tensions rose to a head
is the Indian withdrawal from UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, five
years after the clashes described by Boutros-Ghali over Bosnia, and related by
Gue´henno when two of the major troop contributing countries
announced their intention to withdraw their personnel from the mission,
threatening its complete collapse. They argued, not without some merit,
that they had not signed up to engage in an enforcement operation, and
moreover, that it was untenable that they would have to pay in blood
while members of the Security Council and western nations were only
willing to pay in dollars at best, or through lip-service at worst.48
This was a classic case of UN overreach: the Council extended the mandate of the
operation, thereby inviting the fury of contributing nations (India in particular), as
their troops were now expected to perform functions for which they were not orig-
inally deployed.49 It was in response to such problems that the UN established a
new Peacebuilding Commission: a body that would help to streamline the new
peacekeeping tasks. The Commission is an advisory body composed of 31 states
that brings together the permanent members of the Council, the leading financiers
and personnel contributors to peacekeeping. The Commission works through
country-specific committees focused on states that have ceased hostilities.
Designed to facilitate the later stages of peacekeeping operations, the Commission
also inadvertently formalizes and institutionalizes the extant inequalities within
peacekeeping provision. That is to say, the Commission’s Organizing Committee,
in embracing a variety of stakeholders in peacebuilding, institutionalizes the dis-
tinctions between the financiers and the personnel contributors to peacekeeping.
A number of scholars have tried to account for the UN’s failings in peacekeeping
by seeing these problems not as accidental or contingent, but as systematic outputs
of the UN. There have been varying ways of analysing the sources of UN dysfunc-
tion, most often identified as lying in the gap between soaring UN rhetoric and the
mundane reality of the lack of collective political will. Michael Lipson offers one
distinctive perspective that reads a UN ‘pathology’ in the institutional fragmenta-
tion of the organization itself. In this way, his analysis is specifically tailored to the
character of the UN as an organization. Using sociological theories of managerial
dysfunction to account for the gap between rhetoric and action, Lipson calls this
‘organised hypocrisy’.50 Hypocrisy in the conventional sense, argues Lipson,
presumes a coherent, unitary actor – an actor that is failing to live up to the
ideals that it espouses. No such assumption can hold about the UN, which is, by
contrast, a porous and necessarily flexible organization that must be ready to
adapt to the contradictory pressures of international society.51

























In Lipson’s view, ‘organized hypocrisy’ provides a means of diffusing other-
wise unbearable pressures that would tear the organization apart: by doing one
thing and saying another the UN satisfies conflicting and contradictory
demands placed on it by various ‘stakeholders’.52 Lispon identifies various
examples of this in peacekeeping, including the symbolic commitment to neu-
trality and impartiality of classical peacekeeping (while the actuality is the
increasingly robust use of force), and the ‘sub-contracting’ of operational
elements to coalitions of the willing or regional forces (rather than relying on
the UN).53 Lipson’s analysis is similar in important respects to an analysis
offered by Inis L. Claude.54 Claude’s much over looked contribution to UN scho-
larship was to suggest that it was precisely in its moments of greatest weakness
that the UN may be achieving the most. While Lipson also focuses on UN failures
(or hypocrisy, as he puts it) as the systematic product of UN activity, the limit-
ation of his analysis is that he makes the problem a functional one, whereby
what appears as dysfunctional can be explained away as institutional adaptation
to the pressures of the international environment. But this is less a question of
institutional adaptation than a question of how such institutional incoherence
serves particular political ends.
Claude stresses that the UN developed into its various roles in response to a
specific set of circumstances, and thus ‘this function has not been . . . undertaken
by the United Nations conceived as an independent institutional actor upon the
global stage .. . . an answer not to the question of what the United Nations can
do but to the question of how it can be used’.55 Claude stresses that states
remain the primary agents in controlling the various functions of the UN.
While Claude intended his analysis to apply primarily to the question of the legit-
imating activities of the UN, the analysis can be applied more broadly. In other
words, Lipson does not consider how this uneven organizational structure is
also politically expedient. We must broaden the analysis to consider not only
how the UN survives the pressures placed on it (the object of Lipson’s analysis),
but how the UN serves political purposes by being placed under such pressures.56
Berdal uses Claude’s paradoxical observation to suggest that the UN might be
performing its function precisely when it seems to be failing in some respect or
other.57 Drawing on Conor Cruise O’Brien, Berdal suggests that one major ‘unac-
knowledged function’ of the UN may be to serve as ‘the scapegoat for the vanities
and follies of statesmen’, in O’Brien’s words – ‘a large part of [its] utility to
national leaders’.58 O’Brien offers an analysis similar to Lipson’s, in so far as
he sees UN failure as too systematic to simply be wistfully dismissed. But he
sees this failure as a political service to states.59 The problem is not a new one,
but a recurring one of the peculiar relationship between the activities of the
UN and its member states, as Larry L. Fabian points out:
The decentralism, the impermanence, the improvisation, and the unprofes-
sionalism are all singularly ill adapted to the jobs occasionally thrust upon
the UN by member states who suddenly, often reluctantly, find themselves



























In a very substantive sense then, as O’Brien suggested, the ‘UN’s greatest successes
are its failures’.61
The institutional fragmentation of the UN allows it to provide the means to
diffuse and evade direct strategic commitments and political responsibilities for
a variety of collective decisions. The fact that the decision to make resources
available (peacekeepers, money) does not institutionally correlate with the man-
dating authority (the Security Council) changes the whole calculus of political and
strategic goal formation, and that of means–ends analysis as well. As a result,
peculiar dynamics are introduced to the operation of peacekeeping – not least
the tendency to over-inflate rhetoric and to establish hugely ambitious mandates.
The uneven distribution of the various aspects of peacekeeping formation means
that a greater degree of activity is possible than if peacekeeping were left to one
country alone. It is accepted that more resources can be mobilized by having
more countries involved. But this also changes the very coordinates within
which political calculation takes place. This is the problem of ‘mercenary-ism’:
the fact that peacekeeping forces ultimately only exhibit a shallow, tenuous com-
mitment to the goals of an operation.62 But this applies equally, if not more so, to
the wealthy and powerful states that control the UN. The accusation of mercen-
ary-ism can be flipped around: if it is true that peacekeepers are cheap mercenaries
from poor countries, it is equally true that they have callous and fickle
paymasters.
Conclusion
This article has explored the institutional infrastructure that undergirds and sup-
ports UN peacekeeping, and assessed what this tells us about the form of peace-
keeping policy. If we look to the conflict management infrastructure that
undergirds peacekeeping, we must remain cognizant of the political foundations
on which this infrastructure itself, in turn, rests. As pointed out by Inis L. Claude:
International organizations are never simply the products of creative plan-
ning and institutional evolution; they find their sources deep in the context
of national interests and the power configuration of the international setting
out of which they arise.63
In this way, we have seen that international inequalities of wealth and power are
refracted through the UN’s conflict machinery.
Ross Fetterly acknowledges the importance of multinational cooperation in
UN peacekeeping:
Multinational cooperation and support are essential requirements of
success of peacekeeping operations. As a consequence, unlike at the national
level where democratic governments have the authority and capacity to shift
priorities and programs to meet the demands of their citizens, this flexibility
is muted – and even restricted – at the international level.64
Fetterly is trying to account for the problematic functioning of UN peacekeeping –
but his conclusion could easily be reversed: the problems of peacekeeping can be

























attributed to the flexibility rather than rigidity of the UN. The institutional struc-
ture of the UN – the division between the decision making and the implementation
of those decisions – means that decisions can be made, policies implemented,
without having to bear the full political risks, and consequences of particular
policies. The institutional structure of the UN means that the political risks of
peacekeeping involvement can be displaced on to those forces on the ground.
No single actor bears the full political responsibility for any decision reached –
the result being a radically disjointed structure of varying incentives and goals.
It would be wrong to see this purely as a weakness or dysfunction, however,
for it is also the enabling condition of the UN’s functioning – and no amount of
consultation, coordination, reform initiatives and administrative reorganization
can resolve the fundamental political dilemma at the core of the institution and
its peacekeeping activities. To the permanent powers on the Security Council,
the constitutional powers granted to the Council by the Charter, combined
with the conflict management machinery offered by the UN, grants the tantalizing
opportunity to exercise power and influence over the direction of international
affairs in excess of what would otherwise be possible if they relied purely on
their own will and capacities.65 It is often claimed that developing countries con-
tribute to peacekeeping only for the financial benefits that they receive. But the
poor countries can only gain in this way because rich countries are willing to
financially support the poor countries’ peacekeeping efforts in the first place. If
it is reasonable to suppose that developing countries profit in some way
(whether financially or politically) from their involvement in peacekeeping, it is
reasonable to suppose that Northern countries profit from the former’s involve-
ment too, otherwise they would not support other countries’ peacekeeping
efforts. This benefit, I suggest, is that supporting other countries’ peacekeeping
efforts offers the opportunity to wield influence and direct policy while muting
potential political risks and repercussions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their feedback.
NOTES
1. Cf., Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘The Power, Politics and Pathologies of Inter-
national Organizations’, International Organization, Vol.53, No.4, 1999, pp.699, 702.
2. David Chandler means this to apply to the ‘ethical foreign policy’ of New Labour’s first term in
office, 1997–2001. It applies equally well to the nature of decision making on the Security
Council. David Chandler, ‘Rhetoric Without Responsibility: The Attraction of “Ethical”
Foreign Policy’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.5, No.3, 2003,
pp.295–322.
3. Mats Berdal, ‘The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable’, Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy, Vol.45, No.2, 2003, pp.7–30.
4. James N. Rosenau, ‘Governance in a Globalizing World’, in David Held and Anthony McGrew
(eds), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate,
Oxford: Polity Press, 2002, p.181.



























6. Simon Chesterman, ‘Virtual Trusteeship’, in David Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From
the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.231.
7. Ibid.
8. Mats Berdal ‘The UN after Iraq’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol.46, No.3, 2004,
pp.90–1.
9. For figures on personnel contribution in UN peacekeeping, see the DPKO website (at: www.un.
org/Depts/dpko/dpko/factsfigs.shtml).
10. In support of this view of international organization, see Barnett and Finnemore, ‘The Power of
Liberal International Organizations’, in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds), Power in
Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.161–2.
11. Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politic, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990, p.212. In
the case of UNEF, it was the Anglo-French veto that the US sought to outflank by going to the
General Assembly.
12. Andrew Boyd, United Nations: Piety, Myth, and Truth, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964, p.116.
13. Ibid., p.166. The United States, too, recognized that direct intervention in Congo was politically
impossible, and that stabilization would have to be achieved through reliance on Third World
forces. Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International
Organization, New York: Random House, 4th edn 1971, pp.329–30.
14. David M. Malone, ‘Introduction’, in Malone (ed.), (see n.6 above), p.7.
15. Ibid.
16. Peter Wallensteen and Patrik Johansson, ‘Security Council Decisions in Perspective’, in Malone
(ed.), (see n.6 above), p.21.
17. Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, Global Gov-
ernance, Vol.8, No.1, 2002, p.42.
18. Susan C. Hulton, ‘Council Working Methods and Procedures’, in Malone (ed.), (see n.6 above),
pp.240–41.
19. ‘Almost every formal Council meeting now is a pro forma affairs, scripted in . . . advance informal
consultations [among the Permanent Five]’. Hurd, (see n.17 above), p.43.
20. Ibid., p.42 (emphasis added). Hurd notes that these benefits of non-permanent membership have
diminished in recent years. Despite the lack of real power, the fact that non-permanent member-
ship is ‘a source of authority by association’ reflects the enhanced power of the Council itself.
Ibid., p.43 (emphasis added).
21. For the list of non-permanent members of the Council across the last decade, see the data pro-
vided online by the Global Policy Forum (at: www.globalpolicy.org/security/membship/
mem2.htm).
22. Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Illusion of Security Council Reform’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.26,
No.4, 2003, pp.47–161.
23. Malone, ‘Introduction’, (see n.6 above), pp.6–8.
24. Wallensteen and Johansson, (see n.16), p.20.
25. Ibid., p.21.
26. Ibid.
27. Berdal, (see n.8 above), p.88.
28. Ibid., pp.88–90.
29. Peter Hallward’s analysis suggests that peacekeeping was used as a reconciliation tool between
the United States and France in Haiti. Peter Hallward, ‘Option Zero’, New Left Review,
Vol.27, 2004, passim.
30. Wallensteen and Johansson, (see n.16 above), p.30 (emphasis added).
31. Ibid., pp.19–20.
32. Cf. ibid., p.29.
33. Jocelyn Coulon (Trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott), Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United




36. Author calculations based on figures available in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 Annual Review of
Global Peace Operation, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Here, ‘Southern state’ was defined as
any country that is not a high-income member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD).
37. Kabilan Krishnasamy, ‘“Recognition” for Third World Peacekeepers’, International Peacekeep-
ing, Vol.8, No.4, 2001, p.62.
38. Ibid., p.67.


























40. See, for example, Nigeria Tribune (Lagos) ‘Nigeria Demands for More Appointments in the UN’,
20 Mar. 2008, accessed at: www.tribune.com.ng/20032008/news/news13.html.
41. According to this report: UN Elections, ‘Head of UN Peacekeeping to Resign in June’, 21 Mar.
2008 (at: www.unelections.org/?q¼node/572). Of course, like other international civil servants,
in the EU for example, UN officials are expected to take an oath of loyalty to the organization.
This notwithstanding, national appointments are seen as a means of capturing the UN apparatus
by particular states. Cf. Krishnasamy, (see n.37 above), passim.
42. The current head of the Department, Alain Le Roy, is also French (at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
dpko/info/page1.htm).
43. See ‘Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236’ Report of the Sec-
retary-General, UN doc. A/61/139, 13 July 2006, para. 1.
44. Cf. further the calculations in William J. Durch with Tobias C. Berkman, ‘Restoring and Main-
taining Peace: What We Know So Far’, in Durch (ed.), Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations,
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace/Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006, p.38.
45. Ross Fetterly, ‘A Review of Peacekeeping Financing Methods’, Defence and Peace Economics,
Vol.17, No.5, 2006, p.400.
46. Cf. Victoria Holt, ‘Reforming UN Peacekeeping: The U.S. Role and the UN Financial Crisis’,
Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.3, No.1, 1996, pp.125–34.
47. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.–U.N. Saga, London: I.B. Tauris, 1999, pp.235–6.
48. Jean-Marie Gue´henno, ‘On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Oper-
ations’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.9, No.2, 2002, p.76.
49. Ibid., passim
50. Michael Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?’ European Journal of International
Relations, Vol.13, No.1, 2007, pp.5–34.
51. Ibid., p.9.
52. Ibid., p.12.
53. Ibid., pp.19–23. Of course, by leaving out questions of contribution Lipson misses the fact that
there are more UN than regional peacekeeping operations.
54. See especially, Berdal, ‘The UN Security Council’ (see n.3 above), passim.
55. Claude, (see n.13 above), p.373.
56. A point emphasized by Erik Voeten in contradistinction to the view of international organizations
merely as bureaucracies and international courts, but as political arenas: ‘Political Origins of the
UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force’, International Organization,
Vol.59, No.3, p.552.
57. Inis L. Claude, Jr., ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’, Inter-
national Organization, Vol.20, No.3, 1996, p.379.
58. O’Brien, cited in Berdal, (see n.3 above), p.9.
59. Ibid.
60. Larry L. Fabian, Soldiers Without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1971, pp.35–6.
61. Conor Cruise O’Brien, ‘Faithful Scapegoat to the World’, Independent [London], 1 Oct. 1993.
62. See Edward Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.78, No.4, 1999, passim,
pp.36–44.
63. Claude, (see n.57 above), p.48.
64. Fetterly, (see n.45 above), p.399.
65. As F.H. Hinsley argued, the UN was set up as an organization that was always conceived of as
more than the sum of its constituent parts. While the League was conceived as just that (a
league), the UN was envisaged as a construct. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace:
Theory and Practice in the Relations Between States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967, p.335.
336 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 K
en
t] 
at 
07
:04
 24
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
